



During 2000 several European countries  have auctioned UMTS licences. Holders of these 3G
licenses can offer fast mobile Internet access and mobile video telephony services. The auctions have
had drastic consequences for shares of  telecoms operators and in all countries, apart from the UK,
they have been accompanied with allegations of possible collusion among firms. In some countries, such
as the Netherlands, where the auction was considered a fiasco, they have led to political problems aswell. In this short paper we discuss some (game theoretic) issues related to the design and playing of
these auctions.
1. INTRODUCTION
Auctions are an ancient and common market institution. Herodotus describes that auctions were already
used in Babylon some 4000 years ago (Van Damme, 1997b, Shubik, 1980 ). We all know the
ascending auctions used to sell art and the descending auctions to sell fish and flowers in the
Netherlands. In a seminal article, the later Nobel Prize Winner William Vickrey introduced and
analysed the first formal mathematical (game theoretic) model of auctions (Vickrey,1961). For the case
in which a single object is auctioned, Vickrey addressed the buyer’s problem of how to bid as well as
the seller’s problem of what auction form would raise the highest expected revenue. Given some
additional (symmetry and independence) assumptions, Vickrey proved a version of the remarkable
Revenue Equivalence Theorem, which states that all commonly observed auctions yield all participants
the same expected utility. A good description of the significance of Vickrey’s work may be found at
the site of the Nobel foundation: www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1996/.
At about the same time as Vickrey wrote this seminal auction paper, another later Nobel Prize
Winner, Ronald Coase, criticized the active involvement of the government in spectrum policy and
spectrum management (Coase, 1959). Acknowledging externalities resulting from problems of
interference, Coase  argued that the role of the government would best be limited to clearly defining
property rights and that the allocation of these rights should be left to the market. In particular,
transferring the initial rights from the government into private hands could be done through an auction
mechanism. (See www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1991/). It took some 40 years before Coase’s
ideas were implemented in practise. The first spectrum auctions, which took place in Australia and New
Zealand were, however, not a complete success. The failure of the traditional auction mechanisms to
deliver the desired results put the issue of auction design on the agenda. The FCC, the US agency
responsible for spectrum management, consulted extensively with academic experts about how to
optimally allocate multiple licences before actually engaging in spectrum auctions. The academics
proposed a simultaneous multiround auction, and after this format had been tested in the experimental
lab, it was brought to the field. After experience had shown the design to work well in the US, the same
format was used in Europe to allocate spectrum licences, with the Dutch DCS-1800 auction to be oneof the first on the old continent. (See Van Damme (1997a) for a description of the history, and Van
Damme (1999) for a critical evaluation of this Dutch DCS-1800 auction.)
In most European countries, licences for second generation (i.e. digital) mobile telephony networks
have been given out for free, after a so called beauty contest, in which business plans of  different
operators are compared. Governments, however, realised that in this way they were giving away
“licences to print money”. When it became clear that, for third generation networks (that enable fast
mobile Internet access and video telephony) vast sums of money were at stake, most of them decided
to switch to the auction mechanism. Up till now, the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Austria
have held auctions and Switzerland and Belgium are about to do so soon. In the next section, we briefly
describe the problem that these governments had to solve. Thereafter we describe the solution (the
auction form) that was chosen in these countries and the specific problems that this caused for the
players (firms) participating in these auctions. We also describe how the players prepared themselves
and some elements of the strategies that were used.
2. THE GOVERNMENT’S PROBLEM
A formalization of the government’s problem should specify the goal of the government and the
constraints that it faces. From the official documents, usually available on the relevant web-sites of the
government agencies that organise the auctions, one sees that two goals play a role: (i) creating a
competitive telecommunications market and (ii) raising revenue. In some countries, such as the
Netherlands, only the first goal is explicitly mentioned. Note that the two goals generally will be in
conflict: in a competitive market the firms’ profit will be low, hence, firms will not be willing to pay much
for a licence so that the government’s revenue will be low as well. This raises the question about what
should count more heavily, efficiency or revenue? We formulate this question more generally as “why
auction?”.
2.1 Why auction?
The answer from standard theory, as already given by Vickrey, is that an auction generates an
efficient outcome. Given Vickrey’s assumptions, an auction guarantees that the object ends up with thatfirm that values it most. Furthermore, in Vickrey’s setting, the expected revenue is equal to the second
highest value, so that, essentially, there is no conflict between the two goals mentioned above. The
problem, however, is that Vickrey’s assumptions do not hold in the present setting. For one, an auction
may generate an outcome that is efficient from the firms’ point of view, but this need not be efficient for
consumers. Secondly, firms typically are in asymmetric positions, some are incumbents while others are
entrants and an ordinary auction may give entrants a smaller chance of winning (see below).
Comparing auctions to beauty contests, firms, and in particular incumbents, typically prefer the
latter. The argument is clear: they are likely to win in a beauty contest and they don’t have to pay.
Having to pay an auction price lowers the value of the firm, hence, it lowers the share price.
Shareholders, hence, don’t like auctions. Taxpayers, on the other hand, do like them as the revenues
that the auction brings in can be used to reduce other taxes. The welfare gains can be considerable as
standard taxes are quite distortive. In the political debate about auctions, emphasis has been on the
question of whether auction prices result in higher prices for telecoms users, the layman’s argument
being that firms have higher cost and that they will pass these on to consumers. Economists are sceptical
about this argument, they argue that the auction price constitutes a sunk cost, hence, that it will be
irrelevant for the market price as this is determined by the market conditions. (See McMillan, 1995)
2.2 Auction what?
Through international agreements, 60 MHz of spectrum has been reserved for third generation
telecoms systems. Technical (network) requirements imply that this has to be split up in blocks of 5
MHz each and that at least a capacity of 10 MHz is needed to be able to operate a network. It follows
that only 3 possibilities exist: (i) 4 licences of 15 MHz each, (ii) 2 licences of 15 MHz each and 3
licences of 10 MHz each, (iii) 6 licences of 10 MHz each. In addition, there is the design choice of
whether the number of licences should be fixed in advance, or whether the market itself should
determine which of the possibilities (i)-(iii) will result. The latter option was chosen in Germany and
Austria where 12 blocks of 5 MHz were auctioned and where each player that succeeded in acquiring
at least 2 blocks received a license. All other countries specified the market structure exogenously (see
below).Another important design choice is whether to assist new entrants or not. New entrants are
disadvantaged as they do not yet have a physical network, nor customers. Therefore, they will have
higher cost in building up the new network and they will associate a lower value to a licence. In the
situation where there are as many licences as incumbents, entrants, therefore, have little chance of
winning in the auction. In the Netherlands, Versatel complained about unfair treatment and the “closed
shop” arrangement of having 5 licences and 5 incumbents, a complaint that is presently handled by the
courts. In the UK, also 5 licences were auctioned, but there were only 4 incumbents, hence, one licence
could be reserved for a new entrant. In the UK, entrants were also helped by the fact that they were
giving rights to use incumbents’ networks until they had rolled out their own network, hence, they can
start offering ordinary 2G-services right away.
2.3 How to auction?
The third problem that governments had to solve was what auction rules to use. Here all countries
used a variant of the simultaneous, ascending multiround auction that had been tested in the US,
although there were important differences between the countries. (See below.) In such an auction, all
licences are sold simultaneously. The auction starts at a low price and lasts until no more bids are made.
In each round, bidders are informed about the current state, such as which bidder is standing high on
which lot for what amount, and each bidder that is not currently standing high on one of the lots can
choose one of the lots and enter a bid there. A bidder is free to choose the lot (if a bidder has bid on
A before, but is not standing high there, he may later bid on E, for example) and the only restriction on
the bid is that it tops the current high bid with a certain known percentage (such as 10% at the start of
the auction, 5% later, and 2% near the end). The auction ends when no more bids are made. Those
players that are then standing high get the licences and each winner pays his bid.
3. THE BIDDERS’ PROBLEMS
Once the government has made its decision and has determined the auction rules, the (potential)
bidders face a well defined bidding game. Each player will determine the value that it assigns to winning
a licence and the budget that it has available. Each bidder will specify a goal (such as to win a licence
at minimal expenditure) and will think about a strategy for obtaining that goalThe Discounted cash flow model is the main tool for determining value. Assume, for concreteness,
that one expects to get revenue of Dfl. 100,-- per month for each subscriber and that one discounts
with 1% per month. The latter is the WACC, the weighted average cost of capital, the amount that one
has to make to convince investors that it is worthwhile to invest in the project. If it takes two years to
roll out the network, and, hence, revenues start to flow in only then, total discounted revenue is about
Dfl. 7500 per subscriber. If one counts on 6 million subscribers and a market share of a, then one gets
expected revenue of Dfl. 15 bln. From this one has to subtract the cost of actually building and
maintaining the network, say Dfl. 3 bln., to get to the value of Dfl. 12 bln. What is clear from this
calculation is that main determinants of value are WACC (the higher these costs, the lower the value),
ARPU (average revenue per user), market share and cost of building a network. It should also be clear
that value will typically be lower for newcomers to the market: they can expect only a lower market
share, it will take them more time before revenues start to flow in and they have higher cost in building
a network.(Fortis Bank estimates that, in Belgium, the construction cost are 30% higher for a
newcomer, see Financieel Ekonomische Tijd, October 13, 2000.) 
The game that is played is one of incomplete information as a bidder will not be completely
informed about the goals and budgets of its competitors. Technically, the UMTS-auctions have a large
common value component: if I assign a high value to a licence, then this is because I expect the 3G-
technology to be popular (high ARPU), but then, most likely, the value that a competitor assigns to a
value will be high as well. Because of this common value element, there is the risk of the “winner’s
curse” and to avoid it I have to incorporate the fact that winning a licence may actually be bad news.
The game is a difficult one to play and optimal (equilibrium) strategies are not know explicitly. To
gain confidence in a certain strategy and to find out which strategy might be best, a player typically
organizes mock auctions before the actual auction takes place, i.e. one simulates the actual auction in
an experiment. 
We now describe the various auctions that have already taken place in more detail. The following
table gives an overview of the revenues (in Euro per inhabitant) that have been generated in the various
countries that have allocated licenses thus far. One sees that there are considerable differences. We
note that Finland and Spain have used a beauty contest and that France is going to sell the licenses fora fixed price. All other countries mentioned have used the auction mechanism. 
Country Revenu  (C =/pop)
Finland     0





Austria   82
France 337
3.1 The UK-auction
This was the first UMTS-auction that took place in Europe. Economists from Oxford and
University College London, teams  led by Paul Klemperer and Ken Binmore, had a great influence on
the design of the auction, see www.spectrumauctions.gov.uk/3gindex.htm and Klemperer (2000). 5
licences were sold, A and B were 15 MHz each, while C, D and E each offered 10 MHz of spectrum.
Licence A was reserved for new entrants, only newcomers to the market were allowed to bid on this
licence. This “carrot” attracted many potential entrants; besides the 4 incumbent mobile operators 9
newcomers participated in the auction. Of course, newcomers did not bid only on A, they drove up the
prices on the other lots as well. During the auction, as prices went up, more and more players dropped
out of the auction. Finally, the auction stopped after 150 rounds, with TIW (in which Hutchison
participated) winning A for ^4,4 bln, Vodaphone winning B for ^6 bln. and C, D, E going to the other
3 incumbents (BT, One2One, Orange) for a price of ^4 bln. each. The interested reader may consult
www.spectrumauctions.gov.uk/auction where full information on the bidding behavior is provided.
The UK-auction ran very smoothly, albeit slowly. Newcomers typically bid cautiously, mostly on
the lot that was cheapest. The main problem for incumbents was to decide whether it was worthwhileto bid on the larger lot, and how much extra one was willing to pay for this larger one. Here bidders
displayed different behavior, some bidders bidding only on the small lots, others (Vodaphone) only
bidding on B and yet others (BT) switching opportunistically between B and the smaller lots. In the end,
the auction raised considerable revenue for the government (Euro. 650 per UK-inhabitant), much more
than analysts had expected.
3.2 The auction in the Netherlands
As in the UK, 2 large licences (A and B) and 3 smaller ones (C, D, E) were auctioned. None of
these was reserved for a newcomer. This, together with the fact that already 5 players were present
in the market, implied that newcomers showed little interest to participate. DT, for example, decided
not to compete in the auction, but to join forces with one of the existing players, Ben. Similarly,
Hutchison and NTL, being linked with incumbent operators KPN and Dutchtone, respectively, decided
not to participate. In the end, only one newcomers, Versatel, showed up in the auction.
One may wonder why Versatel participated in the auction, given that it knew that it could not win
the auction. My theory, which I have explained elsewhere (Van Damme, 2000) is that Versatel
participated only in the auction to get favours from existing operators. By staying in the auction, Versatel
could drive up the price for the others, clearly something that the incumbents do not like, hence, they
should be willing to pay Versatel to avoid it happening. Versatel had indicated that it was willing to step
out, if given sufficient compensation. After the auction had been going on for two weeks, the lawyer of
Telfort wrote a letter to Versatel indicating that it had understood Versatel’s motives. Versatel
interpreted the letter as a “threat” and quit the auction, hence, the auction ended suddenly and
unexpectedly. At present, investigations are still going on about whether Versatel and Telfort
colluded.(On November 1, a government hearing revealed that there had been talks between the firms
already on the first day of the auction and on November 3, the Dutch competition authority, the NMa,
decided to “raid” the two firms’ offices to search for evidence of collusion).
A couple of other aspects of the Dutch auction were interesting as well. The auction started with
all players, other than Libertel, not bidding but issuing waivers. This had the consequence that the
minimum price for the lots was reduced to zero, hence, if the auction would have stopped there, thelicences would have been given away for free. Some observers thought that this behavior might be
evidence of collusion. In my opinion, issuing a waiver at a start was a dominant strategy since waivers
only had positive value at that time. The main problem a bidder faced during the auction was deciding
on the premium it was willing to pay for a large lot. It was generally expected that the 2 large lots would
go to the 2 players with the largest market shares. During the auction, KPN only bid on large lots, while
Libertel sometimes switched to smaller ones. Furthermore, there were actually small differences
between the large lots (and between the small ones as well) and players had to act skilfully to obtain
that lot that was desired most. In the end, the large lots went to KPN and Libertel for a price of
approximately Dfl. 1,5 bln., and the  small lots went to the other incumbents for a price of approxi-
mately Dfl.1 bln. each. (See www.veilenvanfrequenties.nl for more details.) The total revenue was only
about ¼ of what the Minister of Finance had expected and revenue per inhabitant was only Euro 171.
The low revenue generated, together with the sudden ending of the auction (and the possible
collusion and insider trading, the latter resulting from the fact that on the last day Telfort was the only
incumbent that knew that Versatel would not bid any more) has led to a lot of public discussion about
the design of the auction and the adequacy of the competition oversight during the auction. Parliament
decided to organize a special investigation about the auction, which presently is under way and which
will presumably  lead to the conclusion that more scientific input in the design would most likely have
led to a better outcome.
3.3 The German auction
The Germans used a different design. They auctioned 12 abstract blocks of 5 MHz each. Bidders
could acquire 2 or 3 of these blocks, hence, market outcomes with 4, 5 or 6 bidders were possible.
Given the fact that the blocks were perfectly interchangeable at the time of the auction, it is somewhat
hard to understand why the Germans allowed bids on the different lots separately and why each lot
could carry a different price. To see how strange this is, imagine that on the AEX you could bid on each
share AHOLD separately and that different shares could have different prices. Given their setting, the
Germans could have simply asked bidders to express their demand at the current price (either 0, 2 or
3 blocks) and then to increase this (single) price until total demand would be  equal to total supply (=12). Hence, we would simply have the standard supply-demand diagram from Introductory Economics
and would increase price until equilibrium would be found.
Especially interesting is the fact that this German design can allow multiple equilibria. The German
2G-market is characterized by 2 large incumbents (DT and Vodaphone/Mannesmann) and 2 small ones
(E-plus (partially owned by KPN) and Veba (owned by BT)). It is natural to assume that, for each of
these players, the value in a 4-player market is larger than when a 5  or 6  player enters.  For
th th
concreteness assume L  = 10, L  = L  = 6, S  = 9, S  = S  = 5, where the subscript denotes the 4 5 6 4 5 6
number of players in the market and letters designate the player’s type, L for a large incumbent, S for
a small incumbent. Assume, in addition that there are two equally strong entrants with E  = 4 and E 5 6
= 2, and that, in addition, there is one weaker entrant. The rules of the German auction specify that
players cannot increase their bidding rights, i.e. if a player expresses demand for only 2 blocks at price
p, then his demand can be at most 2 at any higher price. Assume that when the weaker entrant drops
out (which happens at p < 1), all remaining players have 2 bidding rights left. In that case the auction
stops at that price and there will be 6 winners. Assume that all incumbents still have 3 bidding rights at
that price. If  price increases above 1, one of the stronger entrants has to drop out, and the price will
increase to 2. There is another equilibrium in which each incumbent drops his third bidding right
between 1 and 2 and  which results in 5 winners at  price p = 2. Finally, there is yet another equilibrium
in which all incumbents keep all bidding rights as long as possible and only the 4 incumbents win, at the
price p = 2. Some economists had predicted that price would indeed go up until only incumbents would
remain in the race (For details on this argument , see Jehiel and Moldovanu ,2000).
This is not what happened in the auction and the actual outcome was somewhat of a surprise.
During the auction, DT and Mannesmann drove up price thereby attempting to drive out one or both
of the new entrants, Telefonica or FT/Mobilcom. This, however, was not successful and the auction
ended with 6 winners. Immediately after the auction, Hutchison stepped out of the consortium it had
formed with KPN with the argument that it considered prices to be too high. This halved the market
value of KPN and led to a general impression that it would be next to impossible for Telefonica to
recoup the auction prices. Hence, Telefonica, and possibly also FT and E-plus and Veba, might have
fallen prey to the winner’s curse in this auction.At www.regtp.de (under “Rundenergebnisse)”the interested reader can see the details of the
bidding behavior. Interesting is the fact that some players, such as Mobilcom, were successful in
defending their territory, they increased prices on their own lots to scare other players and to force them
to bid on other lots. Interesting is also the fact that Mobilcom offered one of the other players, Debitel,
room on its network would it win one, thereby giving this player an attractive outside option and thus
lessening the competition. Hence, this might also be viewed as an offer to collude. In the end, the
German auction raised more than DM 100 bln., hence, approximately Euro 613 per inhabitant.
3.4 The Italian auction
The Italian auction was the simplest of those that have taken place thus far. In Italy 5 abstract
blocks of 10 MHz were auctioned. This left 10 MHz, which was sold, at a discount, to new entrants
to the market. Hence, this served as a carrot to attract entrants. In the Italian auction bidders were
ranked according to their bids and those bidders that were not among the five highest had to top the
current 5  highest bid by at least 2% or quit the auction. The auction continued until there were no more
th
bids and then those bidders with the 5 highest bids were awarded the licences for the prices that they
had bid. The auction started at a high minimum price of 4000 billion Lira per licence.
Initially 8 parties expressed interest. One of them, Anthill, did not meet the qualifications imposed
by the government and was eliminated. A second bidder, TU-Mobile could not arrange sufficient
finances and was eliminated as well. This left 6 bidders for the 5 licences, two newcomers IPSE ( a
consortium of Telefonica and Sonera), and ANDALA (a consortium of Hutchison with Tiscali), in
addition to Tim, Omnitel/Vodaphone, Wind and Blu. The latter player was a consortium of BT (20%)
with Italian shareholders. The shareholders got into a fight, and Blu withdrew from the auction. Hence,
the auction ended already after 2 days. The government, being disappointed with the low revenue (half
of what was expected) accused the bidders of colluding and at present a cartel investigation is under
way. (Note that the situation is similar to that in the Netherlands since there was only one more bidder
than licences, hence, the eventual winners would benefit if they could ex ante identify the looser and
force him to quit early.) Fortunately for the Italian government, it had been so wise to set a high
minimum price. Now the revenue raised was still higher than is the Netherlands (Euro 240 per pop),
otherwise it would have been close to zero.3.5 The Austrian auction
The Austrians used the same design as the one that had been probed in Germany. Only 6 players
showed an interest in a license, however. The German auction had shown that a 6-player market was
a possible outcome and it had also clearly demonstrated the risks and high cost involved in trying to
eliminate one of the players from the market. Consequently, one might expect the players to indeed
coordinate on a 6-player outcome. Just to make sure that coordination was indeed achieved, Heinz
Sundt, the chair person of Telekom Austria (the former Austrian monopolist and largest player on the
market) told reporters in the week before the auction that he would be satisfied with just two of the
blocks, and that, if the others behaved similarly, it should be possible to get the frequencies on sensible
terms. (See Total Telecom “Austrian UMTS auction unlikely to scale peaks, October 31, 2000.)
According to Total Telecom, Sundt also stressed there would be no collusion among the bidders and
that Telekom Austria's Mobilkom unit would bid for a third frequency block if one of its rivals did. In
my opinion, Sundt has clearly demonstrated his good understanding of the logic of the “folk theorem”.
Although the Austrian telecommunications authority warned that it would break off the auction if it
detected collusion, it did not really act. Other players also understood Sundt’s message and the
Austrian auction ended after just 14 rounds and one and a half day, leaving the government with a
revenue of just 82 Euro per Austrian citizen. 
4. CONCLUSION
The high stakes UMTS-auction that have taken place in Europe have put the issue of auction
design firmly on the agenda of policy makers in Europe. The simple fact that licences constitute
substantial value for market participants does not imply that governments can easily appropriate a large
part of this value. Basically, only the UK-auction has performed fully satisfactory. Market participants
quickly learned from that auction that competition drives up prices and that, hence, it may be better to
cooperate than to compete. After the UK-auction, consolidation took place in the sector and the
number of active bidders in the auctions was less than expected in all countries that followed the UK.
Furthermore, in all of these countries there have been rumours of possible collusion among theparticipants in the auctions. The general lesson learned is that a good auction design is essential to
ensure that the government’s objectives be reached.
This lesson is important not only for UMTS, but also for other auctions that are planned in the
future. Here one may think of auctions for capacity in telecommunications, or in electricity networks,
or auctions for licences to operate commercial radio stations, or gasoline stations. In all these cases the
problem is more complicated than in the relatively simple UMTS-case, albeit that the stakes may be
lower. This implies that it will be even more important to have a good design. Fortunately, economic
theory contains a lot of useful insights for auction designers, see, for example, Klemperer (2000).
Having been involved in some of these auctions, sometimes on the side of the seller, at other times
acting as an advisor to one of the bidding parties, I can state that auctions are not only challenging
academically, it is also fun to play these games, even when they are for high stakes.REFERENCES
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